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Abstract
Background: Many of public hospitals in Japan have had a deficit for a long time. Japanese local governments have been 
encouraging public hospitals to use group purchasing of drugs to benefit from the economies of scale, and increase their 
bargaining power for obtaining discounts in drug purchasing, thus improving their financial situation. In this study, we 
empirically investigate whether or not the scale of public hospitals actually affects their bargaining power.
Methods: Using micro-level panel data on public hospitals, we examine the effect of the scale of public hospitals (in 
terms of the number of occupancy beds) on drug purchasing efficiency (DPE) (the average discount rate in purchasing 
drugs) as a proxy variable of the bargaining power. Additionally, we evaluate the effect of the presence or absence of 
management responsibility in public hospital for economic efficiency as the proxy variable of an economic incentive 
and its interaction with the hospital scales on the bargaining power. In the estimations, we use the fixed effects model to 
control the heterogeneity of each hospital in order to estimate reliable parameters.
Results: The scale of public hospitals does not positively correlate with bargaining power, whereas the management 
responsibility for economic efficiency does. Additionally, scale does not interact with management responsibility.
Conclusion: Giving management responsibility for economic efficiency to public hospitals is a more reliable way of 
gaining bargaining power in drug purchasing, rather than promoting the increase in scale of these public hospitals. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The scale of public hospitals does not positively correlate with bargaining power, whereas management responsibility for economic efficiency 
does.
• Giving management responsibility for economic efficiency to public hospitals by increasing the Full Application hospitals of the Local Public 
Enterprise Act may be a more reliable way of improving the financial performance than promoting an increase in the scale of public hospitals.
Implications for the public
The financial improvement of public hospitals has been an urgent issue in Japan. This study provides empirical evidence that supports the 
government’s public hospital reform plans.
Key Messages 
Background 
In 2013, 892 public hospitals were owned by local governments 
in Japan (approximately 10% of all hospitals), most of which 
were in a fragile financial condition. In the same year, the 
gross earnings of the public hospitals reached 3.955 440 
trillion JPY (around 39.55 billion USD at the rate of 100 JPY 
to per 1 USD) and the gross costs were 3.998 363 trillion JPY 
(around 39.98 billion USD). The net loss was 42.92 billion 
JPY (around 429.2 million USD), and 52.4% of all public 
hospitals were reporting net losses, which were ultimately 
covered by taxes. This trend in the public hospital deficit has 
been evident for more than 30 years. The factors causing it 
include providing highly advanced medical care and medical 
services in unprofitable regions in accordance with the health 
policy set by both central and local Japanese governments. 
On the other hand, the lack of management responsibility for 
economic efficiency in public hospitals also has been a factor.1
To reverse this chronic financial deterioration, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications released “The 
Guideline for Public Hospitals Reform” in December 2007 
and “The New Guideline” in March 2015. These guidelines 
require local governments to formulate reform plans (specific 
plans to increase earnings and reduce expenses) for each 
public hospital. They also require evaluations and annual 
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reports on the results. Each local government has formulated 
reform plans based on these guidelines.
Many of the reform plans mentioned “promoting group 
purchasing with other medical institutions and utilizing the 
gain from the economies of scale for increasing the bargaining 
power to obtain discounts in drug purchasing” (eg, Tomi 
Municipal Hospital,2 Kyotango City Hospital,3 Otsuki City 
National Health Insurance Hospital,4 Saitama Cancer Center,5 
Nayoro City Hospitals,6 and many others). According to 
these, the intent is that if hospitals obtain such discounts in 
drug purchasing, their material costs would be reduced, and 
their financial condition would be directly improved.
The idea in these reform plans that the group purchasing (ie, 
increasing drug purchase volume) increases the bargaining 
power is based on the concept of the economies of scale. To this 
effect, Galbraith suggested that large buyers have an advantage 
in extracting price concessions from suppliers.7 The gain from 
the economies of scale in price negotiations is amounts to 
countervailing power, on which there already is an extensive 
literatures.8-11 These studies suggest that countervailing power 
does not emerge occur all circumstances but depends on 
other factors of the economic environment. Several empirical 
studies support this suggestion.12-14 
If the economies of scale really exist in the group purchasing 
of drugs, the scale of hospitals should affect the bargaining 
power, because larger hospitals purchase drugs in larger 
volume, which is close to group purchasing. Although, group 
purchasing has been promoted in Japanese public hospitals, 
the relationship between the scale of public hospitals and the 
bargaining power has not yet been empirically analyzed. In 
this study, using micro-level panel data on Japanese public 
hospitals, we empirically investigate whether or not the 
scale of public hospitals affects the bargaining power in drug 
purchasing.
Most of the previous studies on the Japanese pharmaceutical 
market analyzed the effects of purchase prices on demand for 
drugs (prescription volumes),15-19 rather than how purchase 
prices are determined. A few theoretical studies have discussed 
the pharmaceutical distribution market mechanism within 
the Japanese drug-pricing system.20-22 However, these studies 
did not discuss the bargaining power of hospitals.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) conducted a 
questionnaire survey about drug distribution in the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market.23 The survey showed that the 
hospitals that adopted group purchasing accounted for 18% 
of all the hospitals (including private hospitals) in the year 
2006. On the other hand, in the United States, 72% of all 
hospitals relied on GPO (Group Purchasing Organization) in 
the same year. Additionally, the most common answer given 
by medical institutions (89/274) to the question, “Why did 
you not adopt group purchasing” was “Even if we adopted 
group purchasing, we could not expect to obtain significant 
discounts.” Furthermore, the most common answer of 
wholesalers (52/79) about their price setting was “Even if 
the amount of the order is increases, we do not discount the 
selling price.” However, this questionnaire survey covers only 
a small portion of the total number of medical institutions 
and wholesalers (according to the survey in 2006, there were 
9016 hospitals and 3451 pharmaceutical wholesalers in Japan) 
and did not conduct a detailed empirical analysis. To the best 
of our knowledge, this study is the first such analysis of the 
relationship between the scale of public hospitals and their 
bargaining power.
Methods
Data and Variables
This study uses micro-level panel data on all Japanese public 
hospitals, which were collected from the Yearbooks of Public 
Enterprises (CHIHO-KOEI-KIGYO-NENKAN) from 2004 
to 2013.24 The yearbooks report financial and operational data 
of all Japanese public hospitals (including public university 
hospitals and independent administrative institutional 
hospitals) for the business years. The number of listed 
hospitals in 2004 was 1001, and fell to 908 in 2013. During 
this period, the closing or privatization of public hospitals 
resulted in some data loss, whereas consolidations and new 
establishments generated some sample data. Therefore, this 
panel data is unbalanced. As a result of excluding the samples 
with missing values and outliers (we excluded 16 samples as 
outliers, drug purchasing efficiency [DPE] of which exceeded 
1000), the final number of hospitals for analyses is 995 and 
the sample size is 8338 during the estimation period (from 
2004 to 2013). 
In the estimations, the dependent variable should 
conceptually be bargaining power. Unfortunately, bargaining 
power associated with group purchasing is not directly 
observable. Therefore, we use the DPE (drug-earnings/drug-
expenses × 100) of each hospital as the proxy measurement 
of the bargaining power. The DPE is defined by the Japanese 
government and reported in the yearbooks. In the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market, the reimbursement price of ethical 
drugs is officially set by the drug pricing system. On the 
other hand, the free market price is allowed as a procurement 
price (the purchasing price of hospitals from wholesalers). 
Therefore, the DPE indicates the average discount rate (ie, 
the bargaining power) gained by each hospital in the business 
year. When the DPE is over 100, the hospital gained discounts 
on average. On the other hand, when the value is below 100, 
the hospital purchased drugs at a higher price than the official 
reimbursement price.
Although the independent variable should be representing the 
economies of scale in the group purchasing, the data showing 
if any particular public hospital uses group purchasing is not 
available. Therefore, we use the “number of occupancy beds 
(NOB)” as a proxy variable for the scale of public hospitals. 
The “NOB” is calculated as the “number of registered beds 
(NRB)” × the “average bed occupancy rate (BOR)” for 
each hospital. The NOB can be a more realistic indicator of 
hospital scale, because a larger NOB means a larger volume of 
prescriptions and drug orders, which is nearly equal to group 
purchasing. If economies of scale exist in drug purchasing, the 
coefficient of this variable should be positive. 
Additionally, we introduced a dummy variable to evaluate 
the effect of the presence or absence of public hospitals 
management responsibility for economic efficiency (economic 
incentive), which takes the value 1 for “Full Application 
public hospitals of the Local Public Enterprise Act,” and 0 for 
“Partial Application public hospitals.” The Partial Application 
is a default setting for all public hospitals, where no one takes 
the responsibility for inefficient management, and losses 
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are eventually covered by taxes. On the other hand, the 
Full Application public hospitals are required to appoint a 
manager with management responsibility and discretionary 
power over budget and personnel matters. Therefore, the Full 
Application public hospitals have an institutional framework 
(economic incentive) for efficient management compared 
to the Partial Application ones. Hence, we assume that the 
Full Application hospitals try to obtain discounts in drug 
purchasing and expect the coefficient of this dummy variable 
to be positive. The number of Full Application hospitals has 
gradually increased from around the year 2000 in response to 
the previously mentioned financial deterioration. However, it 
was still only around 30% of all public hospitals in 2013.
Furthermore, we also introduced the interaction term between 
the NOB and the Full Application Dummy to the model. The 
coefficient of the interaction term shows the effect of scale on 
the DPE in Full Application hospitals. Moreover, we added 
“Year Dummies” and “Region (Prefecture) Dummies” to the 
models in order to control for such effects as the drug price 
revision every two years and the competitive environment in 
the certain regions which has been pointed out in previous 
studies.13 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the above variables. 
The DPE and the NOB are converted into the logarithmic 
form in the following estimations, and which also are listed 
in parentheses. The average value of DPE is 108.75 (8.75%), 
which is relatively close to the overall average value of the DPE 
(including private hospitals and pharmacies) in the periods.25 
Moreover, the Full Application hospitals constitute 34% of the 
total samples.
In advance of the following estimations, we confirm the 
stationarity of ln(DPE) and ln(NOB), using Fisher type-
augmented Dickey-Fuller (F-ADF) test to avoid the spurious 
correlation.26 The test results clearly reject the null hypothesis 
that these variables contain a unit root (for both variables, 
P < .00). Therefore, we concluded that the ln(DPE) and the 
ln(NOB) are stationary throughout the period.
Model
Using these variables, we conducted the estimations by 
pooling ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model, and 
random effects model. First, the pooling OLS is as formula 
(1), which is to estimate the coefficient by pooling all of the 
panel data and ignores the heterogeneity of each hospital.
1 2 3
ln ln (ln )it it it it it t i itD B F B F T R uα β β β= + + + × + + +      (1)
where the subscript i = 1,…,995 corresponds to individual 
hospitals; and t = 2004 ,…, 2013 corresponds to each year; Dit 
is the DPE; Bit is the NOB; Fit is the Full Application Dummy; 
Tt are a set of year dummies; Ri are a set of region dummies; α is 
the constant term; and uit is the error term. Since the variables 
were converted into the logarithmic form, each coefficient β 
is interpreted as elasticity.
Next, the fixed effects model and the random effects model 
are in formula (2), which takes into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity of each hospital.
1 2 3ln ln (ln )it it it it it t i itD B F B F T Rα β β β ε= + + + × + + +  (2)
εit= µi + νit
Where εit is error term, and µi is the unobserved time-invariant 
individual effects. In the fixed effects model, the unobserved 
time-invariant individual effects, µi is assumed to be correlated 
with independent variable, and this model is estimated by 
the first-difference (FD) estimation. Lastly, random effects 
model also takes into account the unobserved time-invariant 
individual effects µi. However, the model assumes that µi is 
dependent from the independent variable and this model is 
estimated by the generalized least squares (GLS).
Additionally, we conducted model selection tests among the 
above three models. First, the F test and the Breusch-Pagan 
(B-P) test are used to compare the pooling OLS with the fixed 
effects model and the pooling OLS with the random effects 
model respectively. Next, using the Hausman specification 
test, the fixed effects model and the random effects model are 
compared. The tests determine the relative suitability of the 
models. For more details about the panel data analysis and 
model selection tests, references are available in the texts.27,28 
Controlling for Heterogeneity by Fixed Effects Model
Generally, one of the most important conditions for estimating 
hospital efficiency is to ensure the homogeneity of hospitals in 
the sample data.29 However, Japanese public hospitals exhibit 
significant heterogeneity in their facilities characteristics 
and roles. They also vary in the scale of hospital beds (from 
20 to 1368 in the data set) and provide different services in 
terms of the health policy (eg, some public hospitals provide 
highly advanced medical care, while others play a major role 
in community-based health care or provide medical services 
in unprofitable regions). Such heterogeneity may cause an 
estimation bias, which can do harm to the validity of the 
estimation results. However, fixed effects model can control 
this bias as the unobserved time-invariant individual effects µi 
of each hospitals by estimating the first differences models and 
eliminating the µi from the model. Therefore, we can estimate 
more reliable parameters in an insufficiently homogenized 
situation.30 
Results
Table 2 shows these estimation results. First, the results 
of the model selection tests (F test, B-P test and Hausman 
specification test) show that the fixed effects model is 
the most suitable model for the data. The results indicate 
that the individual effects of each hospital on DPE are 
observed throughout the period. Hence, we are focusing 
on the results of the fixed effects models (2), (5), and (8). 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observation Mean SD Min Max
DPE (ln) 8338 108.75 
(4.65)
33.75 
(0.27)
4.50 
(1.50)
988.10 
(6.90)
NRB 8338 239.81 188.76 20 1368
Average BOR 8338 0.73 0.16 0.09 1.04
NOB (NRB × BOR) (ln) 8338 182.41 
(4.80)
158.82 
(0.96)
0.34 
(-1.07)
977.96 
(6.89)
Full Application Dummy 8338 0.34 0.47 0 1
Abbreviations: DPE, drug purchasing efficiency; NRB, number of registered 
beds; BOR, bed occupancy rate; NOB, number of occupancy beds; SD, 
standard deviation.
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Next, the coefficients of the NOB are not significant in model 
(2), and (5). However, in the model (8) the coefficient is 
significantly negative. The results suggest that the scale of 
public hospitals and the DPE have no positive correlation; 
rather it has a negative correlation in the more controlled 
model (8). The coefficient parameters show that when the 
NOB increases by 1%, the DPE decreases by only 0.11%. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the “Full Application 
Dummy of the Local Public Enterprise Act” show significantly 
positive correlation in all models as expected. The differences 
in the DPE between of the Full Application hospitals and the 
Partial Application hospitals are approximately 37% and 49% 
in models (5), and (8), respectively. 
The coefficients of the interaction term between NOB and 
Full Application Dummy are slightly negative at the 1% 
significant level in all cases. This result shows that the scale of 
public hospitals and the DPE have also no positive interaction 
in the Full Application hospitals.
Discussion 
The NOB coefficients indicate that the scale of public hospitals 
does not positively affect the bargaining power in purchasing 
drugs, which means that the scale of public hospitals does not 
matter in drug purchasing negotiations. One possible reason 
for this is that they did not negotiate with wholesalers in the 
first place for lack of the economic incentive (management 
responsibility for efficient management).1 
On the other hand, the coefficients of “Full Application 
Dummy variable of the Local Public Enterprise Act,” which 
represent the management responsibility of public hospitals 
show a significantly positive value in all models. The results 
indicate that public hospitals with management responsibility 
did negotiate a purchase price and could obtain substantial 
discounts relative to public hospitals with no management 
responsibility. In other words, Full Application of the Local 
Public Enterprise Act seems to play a role as an incentive to 
make public hospitals put more effort into price negotiations. 
Furthermore, the small negative coefficients of the interaction 
term between NOB and Full Application Dummy suggest 
that the scale of Full Application public hospitals has no 
positive effect on their bargaining power as well. In other 
words, it is not economies of scale but the economic incentive 
(management responsibility for efficient management) that 
enables to obtain significant discounts. 
The open question is why the findings indicate that public 
hospitals do not exploit gains from economies of scale in price 
negotiations, to which there are three possible answers. One is 
that they simply do not utilize the economies of scale because 
they do not have the economic incentive to use this gain. 
The second one is the omitted-variable bias. The low level 
coefficients of determination (R2 = 0.06~0.14) suggest that 
there may be other factors affecting the DPE. Usually, the 
unobserved individual effect in fixed effects model improves 
this bias. However, the previous empirical study suggested 
that supplier competition (interaction with the substitution 
opportunities for buyers) is a prerequisite for the economies 
of scale in drug purchasing.13 In this study, the competitive 
environment in the region (Prefecture) has been roughly 
controlled by the region dummy variable or the unobserved 
individual effect. Nevertheless, we were unable to investigate 
the interaction between a hospital’s scale and their substitution 
opportunities due to data constraints. Hence, a more detailed 
analysis is required for this point. 
The third reason is that large scale hospitals provide highly 
advanced medical care which obliges them to use new drugs 
in patent time (no competition with other drugs) than generic 
drugs, which in turn leads to lower discount rate. The negative 
correlations between the scale of public hospitals and their 
bargaining power in the result indicate this possibility.
Conclusion
In this study, using micro-level panel data on all Japanese 
public hospitals, we empirically investigated whether or 
not the scale of public hospitals affects their bargaining 
Table 2. Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: ln(DPE)
Variables OLS (1) FE (2) RE (3) OLS (4) FE (5) RE (6) OLS (7) FE (8) RE (9)
ln(NOB) -0.07*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.06***  -0.02 -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.07***
Full App Dummy (F)  0.16***  0.37***  0.33*** 0.11*** 0.49*** 0.38***
ln(NOB) × (F) -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.02** -0.09*** -0.07***
Year Dummies (9) No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies (46) No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Observation 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338
Number of Hospitals 995 995 995 995 995 995 995 995 995
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.15
R2（within） 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.13
R2（between） 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12
R2（overall） 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.14
F test  0.00 0.00  0.00
Hausman test  0.00 0.00  0.00
B-P test  0.00 0.00  0.00
Abbreviations: OLS, ordinary least squares; DPE, drug purchasing efficiency; FE, fixed effects; RE, random effects;  B-P, Breusch-Pagan.
Note: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The constant terms are omitted. 
All estimations and tests were performed by Stata/SE 14.0.
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power. Additionally, we evaluated the effects of the presence 
or absence of management responsibility for economic 
efficiency in public hospitals and its interaction with the 
scale effects on the bargaining power. The results indicate 
no positive correlations between scale and bargaining 
power, whereas there are correlations between management 
responsibility and bargaining power. Simply put, the scale 
does not matter, but economic incentive does. This suggests 
that giving management responsibility to public hospitals 
is a more reliable way of increasing bargaining power in 
drug purchasing, thus improving their financial situation, 
rather than promoting the increase in the scale of public 
hospitals.
Therefore, increasing the number of Full Application hospitals 
of the Local Public Enterprise Act (currently, as indicated, 
it remains around 30% as indicated) appears to improve 
the overall financial condition of public hospitals. Since the 
financial improvement of public hospitals has been an urgent 
issue in Japan, this study provides an empirical evidence to 
support the public hospital reform plans.
However, the study has some limitations as follows. First, the 
low coefficients of determination in the estimation results 
indicate that there are other factors affecting the DPE, as 
previously mentioned. Therefore, we should scrutinize 
other factors associated with the bargaining power of 
public hospitals and introduce a new variable to illustrate 
the determinants. Second, we could not directly examine 
the relationships between the bargaining power of public 
hospitals and the group purchasing because of data limitation. 
Hence, there is scope for future research on drug purchasing 
with more detailed data.
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